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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
:'•'•. Case No. 20060711-CA 
vs. 
MARIA JOCYE JACOBS, 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is not incarcerated 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the conviction for Interference with an Arresting Officer, 
a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section 76-8-305, in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, Judge, 
presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002), which 
grants the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over criminal cases that do not involve 
first-degree felony or capital offenses. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did trial court err in granting the State's jury instructions? 
Standard of Review: This court reviews the "trial court's decision to use a jury 
instruction [which] may.. .have impacted the defendant's right to a fair trial... [is] 
reviewed for correctness." State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, f 19, 40 P.3d 611 (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
Preservation: Appellant requested a transcript of the arresting officer only. R. 
143:4. The record contains only Appellant's prior attorney's proposed jury 
instructions (R. 29-40) and the trial court's final jury instructions (R. 82-113), not any 
objections or motions regarding the jury instructions. 
Issue 2: Did the State present sufficient evidence to meet its burden of proof for the 
charge of Interference with an Arresting Officer? 
Standard of Review: 'The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is highly 
deferential to a jury verdict. We begin by reviewing the evidence and all inferences 
which may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict. We 
will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence only if we determine that 
reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 
(J[29 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Preservation: No closing argument regarding sufficiency of the evidence exists in the 
record. Appellant made no motions regarding the claimed insufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for resisting arrest. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following are statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions whose 
interpretation is relevant to this appeal: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305(1999). 
2 . 
2. Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (2006). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Criminal Mischief, a Class a misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-6-106 (Count I), Interference with a Peace Officer 
Making an Arrest, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code section 76-8-305 
(Count II), Disorderly Conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Section 76-9-102(l)(b)(i) (Count III), and Intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-9-701(1) (Count IV). R. at 2-4. 
Appellant requested a jury trial on May 2, 2005. R. 17. Appellant's prior 
attorney submitted proposed jury instructions June 24, 2005 (R. 29-40) and her trial 
attorney submitted two jury instructions (on how a jury should consider a defendant's 
testimony and Defendant's right to free speech) on March 13, 2006. R. 79-81. 
However, due to discovery requests (R. 18-19, 58-59), the trial did not occur until 
March 14, 2006. R. 70. Although charged with four Counts of criminal conduct, the 
jury found Appellant guilty only of Count II, Interference with a Peace Officer. R. 
116-17. 
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing in pro se that the jury 
instructions "were tantamount to a directed verdict of guilt" and the Appellee did not 
provide sufficient evidence to convict her for resisting arrest. R. 125-26. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy Detective Bettina Barnes ("Det. Barnes"), 
who had been properly trained on all aspects of arrest control tactics, as well as DUI 
arrest and observation (R. 144:7-10), was dispatched to Appellant's apartment 
complex at 2:30 AM on October 21, 2004 with the warning that Appellant was 
possibly intoxicated and throwing furniture. R. 144:13-14, 24-25; 154:6-8, 11-12; 
161:21. 
The complainant asked Det. Barnes to "Stop her [Appellant], she's drunk." R. 
146:10. Det. Barnes accordingly approached Appellant, who was in the vehicle and 
had just put the car in reverse, and asked her to step out of the car and talk to the 
detective. R. 146:11-14. Appellant refused to exit the vehicle, saying "No, no I 
haven't done anything wrong." R. 147:6-7. Det. Barnes then opened the car door and 
ordered Appellant out of vehicle. R. 147:11-12. Upon opening the door, Det. Barnes 
smelled a strong order of alcohol and further ordered Appellant to turn off the vehicle, 
exit the car, and talk to the detective several times. R. 147:12-16. Det. Barnes also 
noted Appellant's red bloodshot eyes. R. 157:7-9 
Appellant again refused to comply with Det. Barnes' orders, gripping the 
steering wheel and screaming that she had not done anything wrong and that she 
needed to get back to her parking spot under the car port. R. 147:21-23; 163:18-21. 
Det. Barnes was concerned that Appellant "was going to put the vehicle in reverse and 
possibly injure herself or me." R. 148:3-5. Appellant's bizarre behavior along with 
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her confused and slurred speech impaired the officer's ability to investigate the dispute 
and learn Appellant's side of the story. R. 148:8-17. Acting on police training, Det. 
Barnes ordered Appellant to exit the vehicle one final time, then held onto one of 
Appellant's arms and took her by the back of her coat to extricate her from the vehicle. 
R. 147:25; 148:1-3; 164:4-17. 
Once out of the car, Appellant started kicking and screaming, saying no while 
Det. Barnes and Deputy S. Crawford tried to remove Appellant's arm from underneath 
her body so that they could place her in handcuffs. R. 148:20-25. Eventually, the 
officers were able to roll Appellant over and detain her in handcuffs. R. 148:3-7. 
Based on what the complainant told Det. Barnes, Appellant was then placed under 
arrest. R. 150:2-5. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant seeks to appeal her conviction by jury without following the briefing 
requirements set forth in appellate procedure. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9) (2006). 
Appellant deprived the Court of an objective account of the evidence against 
Appellant at trial by not marshaling the facts in light most favorable to her conviction. 
By making arguments for the first time on appeal, Appellant not only violates 
the doctrine of preservation, but she also prevents the trial court from making a ruling 
on her claim of error during trial. More importantly, Appellant is able to benefit from 
the strategic effort to reduce objections at trial while increasing her claims of error for 
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appeal. The courts have repeatedly held that such behavior is the rationale behind the 
perseveration rule. 
Appellant inhibits this Court from making a decision on the merits by failing to 
adequately brief the court on the issues for appeal, depriving the Court of the best 
argument of both adversarial parties. This in turn requires the Court to do Appellant's 
work for her, something which the Court is not usually inclined to do. 
Even if Appellant had properly followed appellate procedural requirements, her 
claims of error would still fail on the merits. Appellant mistakenly argues that the 
State was required to prove that she 1) had knowledge that the officer was seeking to 
lawfully arrest her, 2) the arrest and detention was lawful, and 3) Appellant resisted by 
use of force or use of any weapon. 
In fact, the case law clearly states that the legality of the arrest and/or detention 
is irrelevant. Moreover, actual knowledge is not required under the statute, rather one 
can meet one of the elements of the statute if one "should have knowledge" "by the 
exercise of reasonable care." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999). Finally, the use of 
force is not required, rather one can interfere with an arrest or detention by refusing to 
cooperate or failing follow lawful orders of police officers. 
Therefore, this Court should summarily AFFIRM the trial court's conviction and 
DISMISS this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
L APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE FACTS. 
Because Appellant did not meet the marshaling requirement, this Court must 
rely on the trial court's findings. 'To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to 
support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in 
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, \ 14, 
989 P.2d 1065 (quotations and citations omitted). "If the evidence is inadequately 
marshaled, this court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the 
evidence." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 19, 100 P.3d 1177. 
The marshaling requirement calls for "a party challenging factual findings to 
marshal all of the evidence and the inferences that can be made from the evidence in 
support of the findings" since "it is through this material that [appellate courts] review 
the findings." State v. Valdez, 2003 UT App 100, f 20 n. 11, 68 P.3d 1052. 
Appellants who adequately marshal the facts " 'present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at [the hearing] which 
supports the very findings [she] resists.' " State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, f 17, 124 P.3d 
235 (citation omitted). That is, the Appellee must play the "devil's advocate" by 
"removing][her] own prejudices and fully embracing] the [State's] position." Chen, 
at f 78 (internal quotations omitted). 
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"[S]imply rearguing and recharacterizing the trial court's factual findings does 
not constitute marshaling." Clark, at f 17. That is, when an appellant "merely recites 
his own version of the facts, and presents none of the evidence supporting the 
conviction[]," appellate courts "will not consider" the merits of Appellant's case 
further. State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, f 25, 989 P.2d 503 (citing State v. 
ScheeU 823 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct.App. 1991)). 
Here, Appellant offered no facts in support of her conviction. Instead, she 
restated her own version of the factual findings of the trial court. As such, this Court 
should not consider Appellant's claims of error any further and assume that all 
findings of the trial court are adequately supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
II. APPELLANT FAILED TO PRESERVE OBJECTIONS MADE FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
By making her claims of error for the first time on appeal, Appellant has 
deprived the trial court of a chance to rule on the merits. The "general rule" is "that 
preservation is necessary" to "prevent a defendant from deliberately foregoing relief 
below based on the sufficiency of the evidence, hoping that a remediable evidentiary 
defect might not be perceived and corrected, thus strategically facilitating the 
defendant's chance for a reversal on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \\6, 10 
P.3d 346 (citing State v. Bullock 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989)). 
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"[I]n order for an appellate court to review contentions of error on appeal, the 
errors must be objected to or be preserved in the trial court record." State v. Honie, 
2002 UT 4,115, 57 P.3d 977. "For [a] [defendant to have preserved his sufficiency 
of the evidence claim, he must have raised it by proper motion or objection in the court 
below." State v. Marquez, 2002 UT App 127, f 7, 54 P.3d 637. 
When "the State presents no evidence to support an essential element of a 
criminal charge ... the trial court plainly errs if it submits the case to the jury and thus 
fails to discharge a defendant." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 117. To demonstrate plain 
error, a defendant must establish "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased 
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
This exception to the preservation requirement exists to "avoid a manifest 
injustice" that would otherwise not be subject to review. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 117. 
The Holgate court reasoned that under this statute, the state law demands granting 
relief, "when the evidence is insufficient, even if a defendant fails to properly raise the 
issue, but only when the evidentiary defect is 'apparent' to the trial court." Id. at 115 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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By failing to preserve the claims of faulty jury instructions and insufficient 
evidence at trial, Appellant is not only depriving the trial court the opportunity to rule 
on the matter, she is attempting to have it both ways. On the one hand, Appellant 
strategically chose not to object to jury instructions or the sufficiency of the evidence. 
On the other hand, by not objecting Appellant has claims of error from which to base 
her appeal. This is exactly the situation the preservation rule seeks to avoid. 
Appellant does not claim a plain error, and her claims fail the first prong of the 
Dunn test because there is no error, let alone a harmful error that should have been 
obvious to the trial court. See infra pp. 11-17. Therefore, this Court should affirm 
Appellant's conviction by jury trial. 
III. APPELLANT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF THE COURT ON 
THEMERITS. 
Because Appellant did not properly brief the Court on claims of error, this 
Court should decline to address the claims on their merits and summarily affirm the 
jury's conviction below. A sufficiently briefed argument "contain[s] the contentions 
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds 
for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (2006). "[T]o be 
adequate, briefs must provide 'meaningful legal analysis.' " State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5,1 
22, 128 P.3d 1179 (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 7, 1 P.3d 1108). 
10 . . 
Mere "bald citation to authority," devoid of any analysis, is not adequate. State 
v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 31, 973 P.2d 404 (internal quotation marks omitted). The rule 
implicitly requires a "development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on 
that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also State v. 
Green, 2005 UT 9, \ 11, 108 P.3d 710. 
The Court "may refuse, sua sponte, to consider inadequately briefed issues." 
Lee, 2006 UT 5 at f 22 (citations omitted). "This court has routinely declined to 
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." Burns v. 
Summerhays, 927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (citation omitted). 
In the case at hand, Appellant merely cities various authority, declining to link 
that authority to her claims of error. Because of the insufficient analysis, this Court 
should summarily affirm the jury's conviction in the court below. 
IV. EVEN IF APPELLANT HAD PROPERLY FOLLOWED 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE, THIS APPEAL WOULD STILL FAIL 
ON THE MERITS. 
Even assuming arguendo that Appellant had properly preserved her claims, 
marshaled the facts supporting her conviction, and adequately briefed this Court, 
Appellant's conviction should still be affirmed. Appellee properly provided all the 
necessary and proper jury instructions and established all the necessary elements of 
CountH. 
11 
A jury verdict is reversed "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or 
she was convicted." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993). Appellate courts 
"determine only whether sufficient competent evidence was admitted to satisfy each 
element of the charge [and] whether sufficient evidence was before the jury to enable 
it to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime." Honie, 
2002 UT 4 at 144. 
a. The Jury Instructions were Proper. 
As a whole, the trial court's jury instructions were proper. " This court will 
affirm when the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly tender the case to the jury [even 
where] one or more of the instructions, standing alone, are not as full or accurate as 
they might have been.' " State v. Tuckett, 2000 UT App 295 J 9, 13 P.3d 1060 
(quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (alteration in 
original)). 
Appellant incorrectly claims "[b]ecause the appellant was found not guilty of 
the remaining charges... the jury [is] then [required] to consider whether the action of 
the arresting officer was lawful it its inception." (Brief of Appellant, Case No. 
20060711, at 10). "It is irrelevant to the plain meaning of the statute whether the 
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detention of [Appellant was] lawful or unlawful." American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 
2002 UT 131,1 13, 63 P.3d 675. That is, "the fact that [a peace officer's] attempted 
[arrest or detention] was later found to be unlawful does not divest [the officer] of his 
authority." State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991). 
"The statute does not disregard the Fourth Amendment, but reflects the 
legislature's legitimate preference for orderly judicial settlement of disputes over 
disorderly street brawls." Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131 at f 15. The statute does not 
permit a defendant to claim self-defense when charged with resisting arrest. Salt Lake 
City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1010 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 
1996); see also State v. Griego, 933 P.2d 1003, 1006-09 (Utah Ct.App. 1997) ("This 
statutory crime requires no 'lawful arrest,' nor does it contain any defense that would 
allow a defendant to be violence and disorderly in response to police arrest."). 
"The societal interest in the orderly settlement of disputes between citizens and 
their government outweighs any individual interest in resisting a questionable [arrest 
or detention]. One can reasonably be asked to submit peaceably and to take recourse in 
... legal remedies." Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 572 (quotations omitted). "[E]ven when the 
lawfulness of police conduct is in question... [s]uspects should not be the judges of the 
lawfulness of police action, and the redress of.. .an arrest not supported by probable 
cause or a detention not supported a by reasonable, articulable suspicion.. .is to be 
obtained in a court of law." State v. Tram, 2002 UT 97, f 35, 57 P.3d 1052. 
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In Utah, "there is no common law right to resist arrest," thus any right to resist 
claimed "must be firmly rooted within the 'specific code section' under which a 
defendant is eventually convicted." State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, f 27, 55 P.3d 
1147 (quoting State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991)). "[A]ny effort to 
seek dismissal based on the right to resist would be futile" if the appellant cannot find 
a statutory right within the specific code section. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295 at f 27. 
Since "in codifying these defenses, it [the Utah legislature] did not enact a generally 
available defense based on the illegality of police conduct" to resisting arrest, 
Appellant's claim of error is misplaced. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574. 
Here, the trial court submitted to the jury 44 instructions, containing the 
statutory definition of Section 78-6-305, the elements of the Statute, the definitions of 
reasonable doubt and intent, as well as the only two jury instructions Appellant 
requested (regarding Appellant's testimony and First Amendment rights). R. 82-113. 
All of these instructions are believed to comport with Utah Law; further, there is no 
indication that the jury struggled in understanding any of the terms within the 
instructions. Cf. State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 16, 18 P.3d 1123. 
b. The State Proved All Necessary Elements of Count II. 
Through the testimony of Det. Barnes, the State proved the required elements of 
interfering with an arresting officer. "The statute [Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-305] clearly 
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states that a person is guilty.. .if he has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable 
care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful arrest or 
detention and interferes with that arrest or detention by, among other things, refusing 
to refrain from performing any act that would impede that arrest or detention." Pena-
Flores, 2002 UT \3\ at f 10. 
Other acts which constitute interference with arrest or detention include: the use 
of force, the use of any weapon, the refusal to perform any act required by lawful order 
necessary to effect the arrest or detention, or refusing to refrain from performing any 
act that would impede the defendant's arrest or detention. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 
(1999). "The plain meaning of the 'seeking to effect' language makes it clear that the 
reach of the statute is not contingent on the lawfulness of the underlying arrest or 
detention." Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131 at<j[ 13. 
"To determine when an officer is within the scope of the officer's authority, a 
court must decide whether the 'officer is doing what he or she was employed to do or 
is 'engaging in a personal frolic of his [or her] own.'" Trane, 2002 UT 97 at f 36 
(citing Gardner, 814 P.2d at 574). In Trane, officers were dispatched to the scene to 
conduct an investigation in response to a call from a store clerk and arrived in their 
patrol cars. Id. 'Trane knew that.. .police officers [were] conducting a routine 
investigation and pursuing official police business." Id. Based on these facts alone, 
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the court found that 'Trane had no right to physically resist the order.. .and the officers 
therefore properly arrested Trane on that basis." Id. 
The court must look at circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom to determine whether "the evidence to support the verdict was 
completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust." Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998)); see also 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at c[26. Courts permit reasonable inferences if they satisfy "all 
the requisite elements of the crime." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
"If, from the inferences alone, we are able to conclude that the findings are not clearly 
erroneous, [appellate courts] do not need the findings to be supported by direct 
evidence." Valdez, 2003 UT App 100 at<][20n. 11. 
Applying all reasonable inferences from the Record, Appellant knew or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known that Det. Barnes was trying to detain 
Appellant. Despite repeated requests, Appellant refused to exit the vehicle. R. 147:6-7, 
11-16. After Det. Barnes forcibly removed Appellant from the car, she began flailing 
about and refused to remove one arm pinned under her chest, requiring two officers to 
roll her over prior to handcuffing. R. 148: 3-7, 20-25. Appellant thus "refused to 
perform acts required by lawful order necessary to effect the arrest or detention and 
made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
305(2) (1999). 
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Moreover, under Trane, Det. Barnes and Dep. Crawford were acting within the 
proper scope of their authority. The uniformed officers arrived in patrol cars, 
responding to a call upon orders of dispatch and attempted to conduct a routine 
investigation into the allegations of the domestic dispute. R. 144:21-25; 145:1-2; 
153:1-15; 157:18-22. This investigation was impeded by Appellant's refusal to exit 
her vehicle and speak with the officers. R. 148:8-17. 
Therefore, at trial, the Appellee proved all necessary elements of the crime 
charged in Count II. The jury found Appellant guilty of Count II beyond a reasonable 
doubt, but not on the remaining charges. Appellant has failed to provide any evidence 
that any of these elements were not met, other than her own version of the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's brief fails to marshal the facts in the light most favorable to her 
conviction. Moreover, Appellant's claims of error are not preserved on the record, nor 
does she claim plain error. Appellant's brief fails to show a meritorious position by 
providing sufficient analysis of the facts to the appropriate case law. This means that 
the court is not obliged to analyze Appellant's claims on the merits and may 
summarily affirm the jury's conviction below. 
Regardless, if the Court proceeds to address the merits of the appeal, the 
legality of her detention and arrest are irrelevant to the determination of whether 
Appellant resisted arrest. There is no proper claim of self-defense to an arrest, lawful 
17 
or not. Therefore, this Court should AFFIRM Appellant's conviction and DISMISS 
Appellant's appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on /2^ December 2006. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake/Bounty District Attorney 
Gregory fih HerbracI 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the exercise 
of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a 
lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with the arrest or 
detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing any act 
that would impede the arrest or detention. 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
RULE 24. BRIEFS 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts 
of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's 
fees incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for 
such an award. 
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